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This paper studies the health effects of one of the world’s largest demand-side financial 
incentive programmes – India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana. Our difference-in-difference 
estimates exploit heterogeneity in the implementation of the financial incentive programme 
across districts. We find that cash incentives to women were associated with increased 
uptake of maternity services but there is no strong evidence that the JSY was associated 
with a reduction in neonatal or early neonatal mortality. The positive effects on utilisation 
are larger for less educated and poorer women, and in places where the cash payment was 
most generous. We also find evidence of unintended consequences. The financial incentive 
programme was associated with a substitution away from private health providers, an 
increase in breastfeeding and more pregnancies. These findings demonstrate the potential 
for financial incentives to have unanticipated effects that may, in the case of fertility, 
undermine the programme’s own objective of reducing mortality.  
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I. Introduction 
One of the main challenges for global health is to identify policies and strategies that 
improve the health of women and children (United Nations, 2010). The traditional focus of 
much of the medical literature has been on intervention research resulting in unprecedented 
knowledge on what health technologies work (Bhutta et al., 2008; Campbell and Graham, 
2006; Jones et al., 2003). Never before have policymakers in developing countries had such 
a wealth of evidence at their disposal. Indeed, countries that achieved universal coverage 
of life-saving interventions have seen rapid reductions in mortality. For example, over the 
past two decades Thailand, Vietnam and Sri Lanka have developed a comprehensive 
primary health care system. All these countries between 1990 and 2006 witnessed average 
yearly reductions in under five mortality of over 5 percent (Rohde et al., 2008). Yet across 
the developing world more broadly there are large gaps in coverage, particularly amongst 
the poorest (Bhutta et al., 2010). A key question then is whether there are policies that can 
be introduced within health systems – termed here health system interventions – which can 
be shown to improve uptake of priority health services. 
 
In an effort to improve population coverage of health interventions and narrow the 
differences between income groups, policymakers in developing countries are becoming 
increasingly bold in their reforms. One promising strategy is to provide financial incentives 
to individuals who exhibit certain behaviours that improve health.2 This is the key feature 
of various programmes that have become popular in recent years. Whether the incentive 
takes the form of conditional cash transfers, vouchers or one-off cash payments, the central 
idea of providing monetary rewards conditional on measurable actions is the same. 
Financial incentives have courted considerable controversial, with views ranging from “as 
close as you can come to a magic bullet” to a “form of bribery” (Dugger, 2004; Marteau et 
al., 2009). Critics point to the theoretical possibility of unintended consequences as well as 
moral concerns over their use, particularly in a health setting. 
 
This paper studies the early effects of one of the largest cash incentive programmes for 
health in the world. With an annual expenditure of 8.8 billion rupees or $207 million, and 
an estimated 7.1 million individual beneficiaries,3 India’s national Janani Suraksha Yojana 
(JSY) provides cash to women who give birth in a health facility. The JSY provides an 
ideal testing ground to examine the effects of financial incentives on health. Although 
officially launched in 2005, implementation of the JSY across districts was incremental, 
providing variation in its coverage. At the same time, much of the health policy 
environment in India is common within states, which gives us more confidence that district 
variation in the JSY is not acting as a proxy for other policy initiatives. A second advantage 
of this setting is the narrow focus of the JSY on women at childbirth. This provides greater 
scope for examining unintended consequences of the financial incentives on closely related 
but non-incentivised behaviours. A third advantage is the scale at which the JSY was 
                                                     
2 In this paper we are interested in demand-side financial incentives, rather than provider payment mechanisms 
such as pay-for-performance. The latter reward physicians for improvements in quality of care and other 
measures, and are popular in the US and UK. For brevity, we will use the term financial or cash incentives in 
health to refer to schemes that target the users of health care. 
3 These figures refer to 2007/08, the financial year closest to our study period.  
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implemented. This differentiates our study from carefully controlled small scale (incentive) 
experiments, whose external validity has at times been questioned (Deaton, 2010).   
 
We identify the effect of the JSY on health care seeking behaviour and health status by 
exploiting the substantial variation in implementation of the JSY across districts. Using 
data on women who gave birth between 2001 and 2008 from two rounds of India’s District 
Level Health Survey (DLHS), our empirical approach examines whether the JSY can 
account for cross-district patterns in health care utilisation and health status over time. In 
estimating the effect of the JSY, this difference-in-difference strategy allows us to control 
for time invariant unobservables at the district level that influence study outcomes and are 
correlated with the expansion of the JSY. Using changes in the intensity of the JSY to 
identify programme impacts, nevertheless, gives rise to endogeneity concerns. Early 
adopters of the JSY, for example, may have been districts that were highly motivated to 
make improvements in maternal health services. While we provide extensive robustness 
checks on our main findings, we are unable to rule out the possibility of confounding and 
refrain from making strong claims of causality.   
 
Our results show that the JSY was associated with an increase in the proportion of women 
who give birth in a public health facility. Estimates suggest the magnitude of this effect 
was reasonably modest. The positive association between the JSY and women giving birth 
in a public health facility was driven almost entirely by increases in the use of primary 
health centres and community health centres, providers offering more basic services than 
those available at the district hospital. In addition, we present evidence on the effect of the 
JSY on health outcomes, finding no strong evidence of an effect on either neonatal 
mortality (deaths within 28 days of birth) or one-day mortality (deaths within 24 hours of 
birth). We note, however, that confidence intervals are not sufficiently tight to reject a 
modest effect of the JSY on these mortality outcomes.  
 
We also provide evidence on a number of unintended consequences. First, a lack of 
implementation of the JSY much beyond the public sector means that the financial 
incentives resulted in women substituting away from giving birth in the private sector. 
Second, results show that the JSY had a positive, statistically significant effect on 
pregnancies. Third, we find evidence of indirect benefits. Women in JSY districts were 
more likely to start early breastfeeding within one hour of childbirth.  
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by reporting more credible treatment effects 
than previous studies on the JSY. Our main results are consistent with much of the evidence 
emerging from conditional cash transfer programmes and small scale incentive 
experiments.4 We also go beyond the typical study of financial incentives in examining 
unintended consequences. Similar to the findings from studies in Brazil (Morris et al., 
2004b) and Honduras (Morris et al., 2004a), we document evidence of unintended effects, 
which highlight how important it is for policymakers to consider the full range of effects 
in the design of financial incentive schemes. More generally we connect to a second 
                                                     
4 The systematic literature reviews on conditional cash transfers (Lagarde et al., 2007) and demand-side 
incentives in health (Murray et al., 2014) provide a detailed summary of much of this evidence. 
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literature evaluating the impact of health system interventions and policies. This is a wide 
ranging and challenging area of research (Mills et al., 2008), and one in which much of the 
existing econometric evidence focuses on the impact of health financing initiatives.5 
 
Given that the JSY remains a high-profile federal health programme in India, the findings 
are of relevance to policy. First, they argue for much better administration of the 
programme. If disbursement of the JSY cash were improved, the effect on use of formal 
health care would be greater than at present. Second, the findings reinforce the growing 
sentiment that demand-side intervention by government can be effective in improving 
uptake of health services but alone may be insufficient to improve health outcomes. 
Strengthening the quality of primary health care and the referral system in India is thus a 
critical complementary strategy, as is staggering supply- and demand-side investments over 
time such that individuals are encouraged to use services once quality has improved. Third, 
the findings suggest that financial incentives may be an imprecise tool for changing health-
related behaviours. They can have unintended health effects, on fertility for example, which 
may undermine the programme’s own objectives. Financial incentives must therefore be 
used with caution.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the JSY and addresses the 
theoretical predictions of its impact on health-related behaviours. Section III describes the 
data. Section IV presents the empirical strategy. Section V presents the main econometric 
results and includes a discussion of robustness checks. Section VI examines heterogeneity 
in the impact of the JSY, and Section VII offers concluding comments.  
 
 
II. Background 
II.A India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana 
Despite the long history of well-intentioned family welfare policies and some recent 
progress, maternal and child mortality in India remains high. With 72,000 maternal deaths, 
no other country accounts for a larger proportion of global mortality (Kassebaum et al., 
2014). Maternal mortality has fallen by 47 percent from 398 deaths per 100,000 live births 
in 1997-98 to 178 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2010-12 (Registrar General of India, 
2006, 2013). However, the national picture masks enormous differences across states. For 
example, Kerala’s maternal mortality rate is almost five times lower than some of the worst 
performing northern Indian states (Registrar General of India, 2013). National surveys 
show that institutional deliveries have increased modestly over time but a large proportion 
of women continue to give birth at home (International Institute for Population Sciences, 
1995; International Institute for Population Sciences and Macro International, 2007). Even 
when women do reach a health facility to give birth, health workers are often absent 
(Chaudhury et al., 2006; Muralidharan et al., 2011) and the quality of care they receive is 
low (Das and Hammer, 2006; Das and Hammer, 2007; Das et al., 2008). 
                                                     
5 See, for example, studies on health insurance (Babiarz et al., 2010; Finkelstein et al., 2011; King et al., 2009; 
Manning et al., 1987; Thornton et al., 2010; Wagstaff et al., 2009). 
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It is against this background that the federal government launched the National Rural 
Health Mission (NRHM) in 2005. Key elements of the programme include large 
investments in health infrastructure, the deployment of three quarters of a million newly 
created accredited social health activists as frontline health workers in the community, 
strategies to stimulate demand for health services, and decentralisation of the health system 
(Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2005). One of the more high profile components 
of the NRHM is the Janani Suraksha Yojana (translated as “Safe Motherhood Scheme”). It 
was launched officially in April 2005, with the objective of improving maternal and 
neonatal health through the promotion of institutional deliveries.6 It provides a cash 
incentive to women who give birth in a public health facility or, in principle, an accredited 
private health provider (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2006).  
 
The JSY programme designates Indian states as low performing or high performing, 
varying the cash amount to provide greater incentives in the area of higher priority. 
Specifically, women in low-performing states are offered 1,400 Rs ($31) in rural areas and 
1,000 Rs ($22) in urban areas, and those in high-performing states are given 700 Rs ($16) 
in rural areas and 600 Rs ($13) in urban areas.7 To put these amounts in perspective, annual 
Gross National Income per capita was $1000 in 2007 and the average amount paid for 
delivery care in the public sector was $25 in 2004 (Bonu et al., 2009). The cash payment is 
available to all women in the low-performing states; by contrast, it is offered in high-
performing states only to women living in households below the poverty line, belonging to 
scheduled castes and tribes, or those who have had two or fewer live births. The policy 
stipulates that the cash is to be disbursed to the mother immediately at the institution itself 
and within a week of delivery. 
 
To provide incentives for health workers who encourage women to give birth in a formal 
care provider, accredited social health workers are offered a cash payment of between 200 
Rs ($4) and 600 Rs ($13) for each delivery attended. The JSY also pays 500 Rs ($11) to 
women who give birth at home, conditional on less than two living children and a below 
the poverty line card, but since this is a direct continuation of the cash assistance provided 
under the National Maternity Benefit Scheme, it does not represent an additional incentive 
for eligible women to stay at home for delivery. 
 
 
                                                     
6 Ethnographic research in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh casts doubt on the government strategy to encourage 
institutional deliveries as a means to improve the health of women. Jeffrey and Jeffrey (2010) argue that the 
context surrounding the government provision of health care presents challenges that neither the NRHM nor 
the JSY were intended to address. Decades of mistrust of government health services and controversial family 
planning programmes have left a credibility gap not easily filled by offering financial incentives and investing 
in new infrastructure. In line with a report by Human Rights Watch (2009), they contend that accountability of 
government health providers to the population they serve is key and nothing less than “a dismantling of a long-
standing political economy of health care provision” will help to remedy the situation. 
7 The low-performing states consist of Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, 
Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Jammu and Kashmir. 
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II.B Anticipated effects 
Consider a financial incentive programme that rewards families in which the woman gives 
birth in a health facility.8 Basic economic theory suggests short-term financial incentives 
will increase demand for maternal health care. Financial incentives provided to women 
seeking care in the public sector only change the relative prices of different care seeking 
options and are thus expected to lead to a substitution away from private health providers 
and home births (Gertler and Van der Gaag, 1990).  
 
To the extent that public health providers can meet this increase in demand, financial 
incentives will increase utilisation of health services. If instead public health providers are 
functioning at full capacity or are unable to increase supply in the short-term, financial 
incentives will have little impact on utilisation. Moreover, there may be no overall increase 
in utilisation if the financial incentives contribute to crowding-out of the private sector. 
Whether an increase in utilisation of public health services improves health outcomes is 
not clear-cut, and will depend on differences in the clinical quality of care between the 
various health care seeking choices. We would expect the narrowest difference in quality 
to be between public and private health providers, particularly in terms of clinical as 
opposed to interpersonal dimensions of quality. 
 
While the financial rewards provide explicit incentives to use maternal health services, 
implicitly they also serve to incentivise pregnancy. This effect may manifest itself in terms 
of a reduction in birth spacing or an increase in total lifetime children for women who 
otherwise would not have become pregnant. We also anticipate indirect effects as financial 
incentives increase women’s exposure to health information. Greater contact with health 
staff exposes women to more information on healthy behaviours concerning the mother 
and her neonate. Behaviors shown to have an impact on health outcomes include wrapping 
the baby within 30 minutes of childbirth, initiating breastfeeding within one hour, and 
dressing the cord with antiseptic (Darmstadt et al., 2005). 
 
II.C Evidence on the JSY 
There have been a number of studies on the JSY, some of which have collected primary 
household data (Hunter et al., 2014). For the most part these have been descriptive, 
documenting progress in the implementation of the programme (Devadasan et al., 2008; 
Malini et al., 2008; Verma et al., 2010). By contrast, Lim et al (2010) make claims as to 
the causal effect of the JSY. Impact estimates are based on three identification strategies: 
individual-level matching, a modified before and after design, and a two-period district 
level difference-in-difference approach. The main conclusion from the analysis is that the 
JSY increased substantially use of maternal health care and reduced neonatal mortality.  
 
The study by Lim et al (2010) has several important limitations. First, the headline results 
are based on the matching and modified before and after design, while estimates from the 
difference-in-difference analysis are given less emphasis on the basis that they lack power. 
Having imprecise estimates from the district level analysis does not provide justification to 
                                                     
8 For a thorough discussion of the economic rationale of conditional cash transfers, see Fiszbein and Schady 
(2009). 
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highlight other methods simply because they have more power. Second, individual 
matching based on whether women did and did not receive the JSY cash is unlikely to 
provide credible estimates of effect because there is reverse causality (women receive the 
cash when they give birth in a health facility) and individual unobservables correlated with 
outcomes are likely to be important factors in determining who takes up the programme. 
The modified before and after study design is also problematic since it must rely again on 
the strong assumption of conditional independence (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Third, 
a strategy that controls for observables at the district level is more credible because 
selection is now at the policy level where it is likely to be based on observed measures of 
need. However, the share of births in a district in which the woman received the JSY cash 
is an inappropriate measure of treatment because it is mechanically linked to the fraction 
of women giving birth in a facility. By definition, it captures not only the availability of the 
programme but also demand side factors driving utilisation.  
 
This paper addresses the limitations of past research on the JSY. Given the high profile 
nature of the programme, we set out to provide more credible estimates of impact across a 
wide range of behaviours. We also provide new findings on how the JSY affects health 
seeking choices between different types of provider, the heterogeneity of impacts, and 
whether the JSY has unintended consequences. 
 
 
III. Measures and Data 
III.A Study Outcomes 
Data on the study outcomes come from the household component of the District Level 
Health Survey (DLHS), a repeated cross-section survey designed to provide estimates on 
maternal and child health and service utilisation at the district level in India (International 
Institute for Population Sciences, 2010). We use data from two rounds of the household 
survey. The DLHS-2, conducted over the period 2002-04, interviewed 507,622 currently 
married women in 593 districts. The DLHS-3 was carried out in 2007-08 and interviewed 
643,944 currently married women in 611 districts.  
 
The married woman questionnaire is modelled closely on India’s established National 
Family and Health Survey. It contains measures of health care utilisation and health status 
that the JSY would be expected to improve. Our main utilisation outcome is births in a 
health facility, measured using information on the place of delivery of the woman’s most 
recent birth. The analysis also considers variants on this outcome, such as the type of health 
provider chosen, whether a health worker was in attendance and the type of procedure 
performed at delivery.  
 
Our main measures of health status are one-day mortality (death of a baby within 24 hours 
after being born alive) and neonatal mortality (death of a baby within 28 days after being 
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born alive). Both are measured using information on the birth history of women.9 The 
financial year of the most recent delivery and each live birth is established using 
information on the year and month reported by women.10 The DLHS-3 limits the recall 
period of birth histories to 1st January 2004, while those in DLHS-2 are not truncated. 
However, to ensure recall periods are approximately the same in the two survey rounds, we 
drop all observations prior to 1st April 2001. Thus, when we stack the data from the two 
survey rounds, we have observations in every financial year from 2001/02 to 2007/08.  
 
An important contribution of this paper is to consider the effect of the JSY on a second set 
of outcomes that we refer to as unintended consequences of the programme. These are 
outcomes that did not feature in the stated objectives of the programme and are in this sense 
unintended. They include the likelihood of giving birth in a private health facility, getting 
pregnant in a given year, and breastfeeding immediately after childbirth. We establish 
whether a woman was pregnant in a given year using the pregnancy histories contained in 
the survey. To measure breastfeeding, women were asked if and when they started 
breastfeeding the child of their most recent delivery. We focus on breastfeeding within the 
first hour, when information from health providers on the benefits of timely breastfeeding 
is most likely to take effect. All outcomes in this study are comparable across the two 
survey rounds, both in terms of how they are defined and the interview questions used to 
elicit the required information.  
 
Summary statistics on the outcome measures before and after the start of the JSY are shown 
in Panel A of Table 1. Neonatal mortality fell over the course of the two periods from 33 
to 27 deaths per 1,000 live births. Facility births saw a modest increase over time but still 
more than half of women continued to give birth at home. Around 8% of women gave birth 
by caesarean section and a further 2% had an assisted delivery with forceps or a ventouse, 
neither of which changed much over time. By contrast, use of antenatal care and 
breastfeeding improved over time. The proportion of women who reported being pregnant 
in any given year was 8%. In addition to information on study outcomes, we exploited data 
on a broad range of socio-demographic characteristics as detailed in Panel B of Table 1. 
 
The data contain a district identifier which we use to estimate specifications with district 
fixed effects. However, because the administrative boundaries of some districts changed in 
the period between the two surveys, we map new districts in the DLHS-3 onto their old 
counterparts in the DLHS-2 data. In most cases this was possible, leaving 587 districts that 
were consistently defined across the two datasets.11 In estimating the effect of the JSY on 
care seeking behaviour and health status, for lack of data we assumed that the district in 
which women are residing at the time of interview was the same as the one where she gave 
                                                     
9 Unless truncated, a birth history documents every birth a woman has had during her lifetime. It typically 
includes the birth outcome, sex of the child, birth order, month and year of childbirth, age of woman at childbirth 
and, if the child died, age at death. 
10 We work in financial years (1st April to 31st March) throughout because the government’s annual budgetary 
cycle is likely to correspond more closely to the introduction of the JSY than calendar years. 
11 In cases where the geographical boundaries of newly created districts cut across two or more old districts, 
we were unable to map the new districts onto their old counterparts.    
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birth. Available evidence suggests that residents of a district rarely travel to other districts 
to seek healthcare.12 
 
 
III.B JSY Coverage 
Our estimation strategy rests on there being variation in the implementation of the JSY. We 
exploit such variation at the district level, the administrative unit directly below the Indian 
state which has responsibility for planning and implementation of federal and state policies. 
If the financial incentives of the JSY are to bite, households should be exposed to 
information about the programme and financial incentives should reach eligible women.13 
Data on the latter provide the foundation for our measure of JSY penetration and is based 
on responses to the question: “Did you receive any government financial assistance for 
delivery care under the Janani Suraksha Yojana or state-specific scheme.” Specifically, we 
use the term JSY coverage to refer to the number of women who gave birth in a public 
facility and received the cash as a proportion of women who gave birth in a public facility.14 
Full coverage thus implies every woman giving birth in a public health facility receives the 
financial incentive. Because coverage of the JSY is constructed from the sample of women 
who delivered in a public facility, it is primarily a supply-driven measure of the intensity 
of implementation. It is affected not by the demand for care but rather the government’s 
ability to make the programme available to women at the level of service delivery, an 
assertion we test below.   
 
Our measure of JSY implementation is based on beneficiary data from households rather 
than administrative data (eg. budget releases or district expenditure) for several important 
reasons. First, such administrative data may reflect only the intention of the government, 
whereas information on whether a district has JSY beneficiaries implies that the 
government has taken all the necessary steps to start the programme on the ground. Second, 
there is no reason to believe administrative data would be any more reliable than household 
data. In fact, such information is easy to manipulate systematically and incentives are likely 
to be there to do so. 
 
Table 2 shows the expansion of the JSY programme over time. In its first year, JSY 
coverage was less than 10% in 279 of the 587 districts, while only a handful of districts had 
coverage over 50%. Over time coverage of the JSY at the district level increased. In the 
third year of the programme, JSY coverage was more than 10% in 489 of the 587 districts. 
                                                     
12 In a recent survey of women in Uttar Pradesh, we find that only 1.8% of women giving birth in a facility 
travelled outside of their district for delivery. Sood et al (2014) find little evidence of cross-district healthcare 
seeking in a study of health insurance in Karnataka.  
13 A study carried out in 2008 in the high-focus states of Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and 
Rajasthan found that four-fifths of women were aware of the scheme and almost half of women giving birth in 
a health facility received the JSY cash (UNFPA, 2009). 
14 Due to imprecise wording, this question picked up responses that refer to the National Maternity Benefit 
Scheme (MBS), an initiative that preceded the JSY up until its official introduction in April 2005 (see Section 
II for more detail). This explains why 7.4 percent of women giving birth in a health facility report receiving a 
cash payment in 2004/05, before the JSY was even official government policy. We code the JSY coverage 
variable as zero prior to the official start of the programme. While the JSY is not limited to the public sector, 
our measure of coverage considers only public sector recipients of the financial incentive because only a few 
nonstate health providers – in contrast to all health providers in the public sector – were accredited and able to 
participate in the JSY.  
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Figure 1 illustrates well the considerable variation in the expansion of the programme 
between districts and over time. It also provides descriptive evidence of the relationship 
between the JSY programme and facility births. Districts where the JSY was progressively 
better implemented appear to have the largest increases in the proportion of women giving 
birth in government health facilities. 
 
In anticipation of the empirical analysis, we recognise that variation in the coverage of the 
JSY across districts is unlikely to be random. Discussions with policymakers and other 
stakeholders engaged with the JSY suggest that the introduction of the programme was 
prioritised in socioeconomically disadvantaged places. At the national level, the JSY was 
explicitly prioritised according to high-focus and low-focus states. More importantly, 
however, interviews indicated that the JSY was prioritised within states at the district level. 
For example, in the state of West Bengal, health sector reforms including the JSY gave 
particular attention to six focal districts, identified on the basis of health indicators, poverty 
and socially marginalised population groups.15   
 
Empirically we can examine the relationship between JSY coverage and several 
socioeconomic variables highlighted by policymakers. In Table A1 of the Appendix, we 
run a district-level regression of JSY coverage on poverty incidence, the tribal population 
share and average household wealth showing that the three variables of interest are strong 
predictors of JSY coverage. Broadly this remains true when we include state fixed effects. 
The data support the qualitative evidence in showing the role of these district characteristics 
in influencing the decision on where to introduce the JSY. In the final column we see that 
the share of births in a government facility in the year before the JSY does not predict 
subsequent implementation of the programme, suggesting that our measure of JSY is not 
picking up demand side factors influencing utilisation of health services. 
 
 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
Our identification strategy uses a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the impact 
of the JSY on our study outcomes. We compare changes over time in health care utilisation 
and health status with changes in the intensity of the JSY programme. More precisely, in 
our basic specification we run a regression of each outcome on JSY coverage while 
controlling for year and district fixed effects. The fixed effects absorb variation due to 
common temporal shocks and time-invariant district factors.  
 
To increase the strength of causal inference, we also control for a wide range of potential 
confounding factors. Formally, let 𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑡 denote our outcome, a binary measure of service 
utilisation or health status for observation 𝑖 in district 𝑑 in year 𝑡. Let JSY𝑑𝑡 denote our 
measure of programme coverage in district 𝑑 in year 𝑡. Our specification takes the form: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1JSY𝑑𝑡 + 𝜗𝑡𝑍𝑑𝛽2 + 𝑋𝑖𝑑𝑡𝛽3 +𝜔𝑑 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑑𝑡,  (1) 
                                                     
15 Scheduled tribes are historically disadvantaged people in India, given explicit recognition in India’s 
Constitution.  
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where 𝜔𝑑 and 𝜏𝑡 are district and year fixed effects respectively; 𝑋𝑖𝑑𝑡 is a vector of 
individual demographic characteristics including education of the mother, education of the 
husband, maternal age, household wealth, the recall period (months between interview and 
birth of child) and dummies for (categories) of urban residence, religion, ethnicity, parity, 
multiple births and survey round; and 𝑍𝑑 is a vector of district-level characteristics. To 
model the effect of the programme flexibly, JSY𝑑𝑡 enters the regressions as dummy 
variables that correspond to the following levels of coverage: 10-25%, 25-50% and >50%. 
We cluster our standard errors at the district level. 
 
To address several sources of potential confounding, we include interactions between the 
year of birth and the share of the district population below the poverty line, the tribal 
population share, and the district mean of the household wealth asset score, represented by 
the term ϑtZd. Data used to generate these district-level variables come from the DLHS-
3,16 which means we are controlling for differential trends based on 2008 values rather than 
actual trends. 
 
As is clear from equation (1), we run regressions of each outcome using individual level 
data to make the most of the rich micro dataset at our disposal. This allows us to include 
controls for a range of individual demographic characteristics that might affect health care 
utilisation and health status. In using individual level data, we note that the unit of 
observation differs according to the outcome. Each observation is a delivery (the most 
recent only) in the utilisation equations, and a live birth in the mortality equations. In the 
analysis of pregnancies, the unit of observation is woman-year but we must rely on data 
from the DLHS-3 only (2004-2008) because the DLHS-2 did not collect information on 
pregnancy histories. 
 
 
V. Main Results 
V.A Use of Health Care and Mortality 
Table 3 presents estimates of the effect of the JSY on various measures of health care 
utilisation. Panel A present results from our basic specification which includes district and 
year fixed effects. In Panel B, we additionally control for district characteristics and 
individual demographics.  
 
Column (1) shows that the JSY was associated with an increase in the percentage of women 
giving birth with a health worker in attendance at delivery. Specifically, the likelihood of 
giving birth with a health worker was 5.6 percentage points higher in districts with JSY 
coverage >50% than districts with coverage <10%. At lower levels of JSY coverage, there 
                                                     
16 Our measure of poverty is constructed using information relating to the government system of identifying 
poor households. Specifically, it is based on responses to the question: “Does this household have a below the 
poverty line (BPL) card?” Because we are interested in controlling for sources of endogeneity that arise from 
government decision making processes, this poverty measure – rather than one measured perhaps more reliably 
in terms of household consumption – is particularly appropriate for our purposes.  
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was no significant association. Columns (2) and (3) show the effect of the JSY on health 
facility births with the same pattern of results. The point estimates indicate that the 
programme at levels of coverage >50% was associated with a 7.5 percentage point increase 
in facility births and an 11 percentage point increase in public facility births. Columns (4) 
to (6) present the effect of the JSY on utilisation by each type of public health facility. 
These results imply that the impact on public health facility births was driven largely by 
increases in births at community health centres and primary health centres. By contrast, 
district hospitals accounted for only a small proportion of the treatment effect. These 
findings suggest an expansion in uptake of delivery care services at public health providers 
below the district hospital.  
 
Column (7) shows that the JSY did not have an effect on utilisation of antenatal care 
services. The point estimates for three or more antenatal care visits are small and 
statistically insignificant and the result holds irrespective of how we define the antenatal 
care outcome (result not shown).17 This finding is reassuring for our empirical strategy 
because we anticipate no large effect given that the financial incentive in the JSY was not 
explicitly tied to the use of antenatal care. It suggests that the JSY treatment indicator is 
not simply acting as a proxy for other government policies aimed at strengthening maternal 
health services. Further results showing the effect of the JSY on the rate of caesarean 
sections and assisted deliveries are reported in Table A4 of the Appendix. The JSY at 
coverage levels >50% was associated with a decrease in the caesarean section rate and an 
increase in assisted deliveries. The negative impact on the caesarean section rate is most 
likely explained by the shift away from the private sector (reported in Section V.C) where 
the vast majority of caesarean sections are conducted.18  
 
When we include extensive controls for potential confounders the point estimates remain 
essentially the same (Panel B of Table 3). For example, the likelihood of giving birth in a 
government health facility is 10 percentage points higher in districts with JSY coverage 
>50% than districts with coverage <10%. When we include in the model a single treatment 
variable indicating JSY coverage >10%, the findings are qualitatively similar (Table A2). 
This model is more akin to an intention-to-treat analysis in the sense that the estimates 
reflect better the impact of the JSY irrespective of how well districts implemented the 
programme. When we include in the model JSY coverage as a continuous variable the 
findings remain qualitatively largely unchanged (Table A3). For example, a 1 percentage 
point increase in JSY coverage is associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in 
government facility births.  
 
We next turn to the mortality results (Table 4). The results in column (1) show that there is 
no strong evidence the JSY reduced neonatal mortality. None of the coefficients on the JSY 
coverage dummies are significant at the 5 percent level. At coverage levels >50% the JSY 
is associated with a reduction in neonatal mortality of 3.1 deaths per 1,000 live births which 
                                                     
17 Alternative measures of antenatal care utilisation include the number of antenatal care visits. Using a Poisson 
regression we find no effect on the number of antenatal care visits.  
18 By contrast, at the first level of referral in the public sector only 18 percent of community health centres offer 
caesarean sections and less than 10 percent have blood storage facilities (International Institute for Population 
Sciences, 2010). 
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is significant at the 10 percent level. In the specification with the full set of controls, we are 
able to reject with 95 percent confidence a negative effect of the JSY larger than 5.9 deaths 
per 1,000. In columns (2) to (4) we separate out neonatal mortality into its constituent parts 
since we anticipate that if the JSY were to reduce mortality, the effect would be strongest 
within the first 24 hours of childbirth when maternity care is provided. Results in column 
(2) show a negative effect of the JSY on one-day mortality. There is a slight suggestion of 
an effect of the JSY at coverage levels >50%. In the specification with the full set of 
controls, we are able to reject with 95 percent confidence a negative effect of the JSY larger 
than 4.5 deaths per 1,000. Columns (3) and (4) confirm that there was no effect of the JSY 
on later neonatal mortality, which provides some confidence that the findings in column 
(2) are not spurious for we would not anticipate maternity care to have a direct effect on 
the mortality of the baby after the mother is discharged to go home. The mortality findings 
remain similar when we include additional controls (Panel B of Table 3), or replace the 
JSY coverage dummies with either a single binary treatment variable of >10% coverage 
(Table A2 of the Appendix) or a continuous treatment variable (Table A3 of the Appendix). 
 
These findings suggest that the JSY did not have a large effect on neonatal and one-day 
mortality but the confidence intervals leave open the possibility that the JSY had a modest 
effect at high levels of programme coverage. Why was the association between the JSY 
and mortality, at best, only modest? One possibility is that the effect on utilisation was not 
sufficiently large to translate into better health outcomes. A second explanation points to 
the poor quality of care in the public sector (Chaturvedi et al., 2014; Hulton et al., 2007; 
Nagpal et al., 2015; Stanton et al., 2014), and the fact that the JSY increased uptake of 
maternity services at health facilities below the district hospital, which are not equipped to 
manage emergency complications at childbirth.  
 
 
V.B Magnitudes and Simple Cost-Effectiveness 
According to our estimates, the JSY encouraged an additional 710 thousand women in India 
to give birth in a health facility in 2007/08.19 In a quick calculation using programme 
expenditure data, we estimate that the government spent $292 of JSY money for each 
additional facility birth.20 Because the financial incentive is given irrespective of whether 
the individual would have given birth in the health facility in the absence of the JSY, the 
cost per marginal visit is much higher than the value of incentive. Using data on the cost of 
delivery from Bonu et al (2009), we calculate a total cost of $415 for each additional facility 
birth.21 However, while a cost to the government, one could argue that the financial 
incentives should not be considered a cost at all since they represent a transfer of resources. 
                                                     
19 This estimate is calculated by applying the coefficients in column 2 of Table 3 to the respective number of 
live births in each set of districts categorised according to the various levels of JSY coverage in 2007/08. 
20 This figure is likely to represent a minimum cost since we have not factored in administration of the JSY, 
whose economic cost is not captured by programme expenditures. If we assume conservatively that 
administration costs represent 10 percent of programme spending, expenditure per additional facility birth was 
$321. 
21 Bonu and colleagues (2009) report estimates of household expenditure on delivery care from India’s National 
Sample Survey in 2004. We use household expenditure on a private facility birth on the basis that this better 
reflects the full economic cost of giving birth. Because the public sector is subsidised, expenditure on a public 
facility birth is likely to be a gross underestimate. While crude, our cost estimate gives a sense of the order of 
magnitude. Note that the financial data are adjusted for inflation.   
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The cost to society then is only the deadweight loss associated with taxation, the 
administrative cost of running the JSY and the cost of providing delivery care services. 
 
There is a growing literature on demand-side incentives in health against which to compare 
the magnitudes of our estimated effects. In terms of the JSY, we compare our results against 
the study by Lim et al (2010) which suggests that the programme increased use of antenatal 
care (three visits or more) by 11 percentage points, increased facility births by 44 to 49 
percentage points, and reduced neonatal mortality by 2 to 6 deaths per 1,000 live births.22 
Clearly our conclusions are much less encouraging with regards to the healthcare utilisation 
findings. The estimates of impact on neonatal mortality are of the same order magnitude in 
the two studies. The key difference is the mortality effects in Lim et al (2010) are 
statistically significant in two of the three identification strategies they use. Beyond the 
JSY, there is a strong body of experimental evidence that comes from studies of conditional 
cash transfers in Malawi (Baird et al., 2012), Mexico (Fernald et al., 2008; Gertler, 2000; 
Gertler, 2004), Nicaragua (Maluccio and Flores, 2005), Brazil (Morris et al., 2004b), 
Ecuador (Paxson and Schady, 2008), Honduras (Morris et al., 2004a), one-off financial 
incentives in Malawi (Thornton, 2008), and non-financial incentives in India (Banerjee et 
al., 2010), although few are specific to maternal health. The interventions in these studies 
were targeted towards poor families and most provide some evidence of positive effects on 
utilisation of health services and immunization coverage.  
 
 
V.C Unintended Consequences 
Our results thus far have focused on outcomes which, according to the stated objectives of 
the programme, the JSY was intended to improve. However, high powered incentives have 
the potential to influence a broad range of behaviours, which in turn may have both positive 
and negative implications for welfare. Here we study three possible effects of such 
incentives. First, we expect the JSY to increase demand for public maternity services, in 
part, through a substitution away from private health providers. Second, some have argued 
that cash payments for delivery or child health care provide an incentive to become 
pregnant. Third, financial incentives for delivery care may have positive benefits through 
changes in health-related behaviours subsequent to childbirth, such as breastfeeding. The 
idea is that women who give birth in a health facility are more likely to be exposed to 
information on the benefits of timely breastfeeding.23 
 
Table 5 presents the results on unintended consequences of the JSY. Column (1) shows 
that the JSY was associated with a reduction in utilisation of maternity services in the 
private sector. For reference, we reproduce in column (2) previous findings on utilisation 
of services in the public sector. Substitution away from the private sector accounts for a 
sizeable proportion of the effect of the JSY on public facility births. Data from the DLHS 
                                                     
22 See the Online Appendix for a more detailed comparison of the two set of findings.  
23 We also considered other health-related behaviours potentially influenced by exposure to information during 
childbirth, including postnatal care seeking, whether the baby was immediately wiped dry and wrapped, and 
whether a sterilized blade was used to cut the umbilical cord. The DLHS, however, provides no scope for 
measuring these outcomes consistently between the two survey rounds. Child immunization was not regarded 
as a plausible indirect outcome given the long time lag between childbirth and vaccinations.  
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lend support to these findings by showing that the JSY has been predominantly a public 
sector programme despite the stated policy to involve private health providers. Only 10 
percent of JSY beneficiaries nationwide gave birth in a private health facility.  
 
We next look at the results on pregnancies.24 They show in column (4) that the JSY was 
associated with a modest increase in the likelihood of a woman being pregnant in a given 
year. This result is plausible when we consider that it probably reflects a reduction in birth 
spacing rather than an increase in the total lifetime number of children. Either way, there 
are implications for health given that both birth spacing and total fertility are important 
underlying causes of maternal and neonatal mortality (Zhu et al., 1999). Other studies have 
shown that fertility is amenable to change in the face of conditional cash transfers (Morris 
et al., 2004a; Stecklov et al., 2006) and cable TV (Jensen and Oster, 2009) and estimates 
reported in these studies are much greater than the effect of the JSY found here. 
 
The risk of increased childbearing was partly anticipated by policymakers in the design of 
the JSY and these safeguards provide some motivation to scrutinise the validity of the 
pregnancy results. If women with more than two children were unable to receive the JSY 
cash, why would they be incentivised to become pregnant? However, the policy of limiting 
the cash payment to women with two or fewer children applied only to the low focus states 
and was difficult to implement. DLHS-3 data show that the probability of a woman 
receiving the cash incentive after giving birth in a public health facility is statistically the 
same across parity groups, a pattern which suggests policy attempts to mitigate this 
unintended consequence were not implemented.25  
 
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 report the results on breastfeeding within the first hour and 
the first 24 hours of birth, respectively. Both sets of results suggest that the JSY was 
associated with an increase in breastfeeding soon after childbirth, consistent with increased 
exposure to information from health workers around the time of childbirth. 
 
 
V.D Robustness 
Our estimates of effect are credible in so far as our identifying assumption holds that JSY 
coverage is orthogonal to the error term. While it is by definition impossible to test this 
assumption formally, we can mitigate concerns of bias due to non-random placement of 
the JSY by pursuing several robustness checks. Pre-trends are a commonly used tool to 
examine whether the assumption underpinning the difference-in-difference approach is 
credible. Specifically, if districts with different levels of coverage of the JSY have similar 
                                                     
24 For women who report being pregnant at the time of interview, we have no information on when they became 
pregnant to assign the pregnancy to a specific year. We therefore use a random number generator, constrained 
between three and nine, to determine the number of months a woman is pregnant, if pregnant at the time of 
interview. The pregnancy for these women is thus assigned to one of two possible years. Another approach 
might seek to model seasonality in pregnancy. The data, however, show that the probability of pregnancy differs 
little across months of the year. 
25 The percentage of women who received the cash incentive conditional on giving birth in a public health 
facility is as follows: first birth (33.0 percent); second birth (32.5 percent), third birth (29.1 percent); fourth 
birth (33.4 percent); and fifth or higher birth (35.5 percent). While these data are not perfect – the number of 
times a woman has given birth does not necessarily equal the number of living children – they are highly 
suggestive of the policy not being effective in practice. 
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trends in outcomes prior to the start of the programme, we can be more confident of our 
estimates. Descriptive data are reassuring in this respect. Pre-trends plotted separately for 
districts in each of the four categories of JSY coverage are similar (see Online Appendix). 
More formally, using only data prior to the start of the JSY programme, we examine 
whether pre-trends differ according to future JSY coverage. As indicated by the coefficient 
on the interaction between years since the start of the data period and future JSY coverage 
in Table A5 of the Appendix, we are able to accept at the 5 percent level the null hypothesis 
of equal pre-trends.26  
 
We then examine whether JSY coverage is correlated with the characteristics of individual 
women. We have argued that JSY coverage is primarily a supply-side measure. This check 
provides evidence on whether JSY coverage is correlated with demand once we control for 
selection at the policy level. We regress the JSY coverage variable on the full set of 
individual-level demographic controls while including the district covariates. Table A6 of 
the Appendix presents the results of this robustness check. The results in column (1) are 
simply to show that when we fail to account for selection at the district level, individual 
demographics are a strong predictor of JSY implementation. An F test of the joint 
hypothesis that none of the demographics is correlated with JSY coverage is rejected 
(p=0.015). When we do control for selection at the district level, in column (2), we see that 
these same demand-side factors are no longer correlated with implementation of the JSY 
(p=0.290) despite the fact that, as column (3) shows, they are strong predictors of utilisation 
of government delivery care services (p=<0.001). Together these results give us more 
confidence that the variation in our measure of JSY coverage is largely supply-driven.  
 
We performed a range of further robustness checks. These are summarised in Table A7 of 
the Appendix. Long difference regressions using data at three-year intervals yield 
coefficients similar to the main results (Panel A). Dropping districts with a high neonatal 
mortality rate of over 50 deaths per 1,000 live births (6 percent of districts) leads to almost 
identical coefficients (Panel B). Excluding districts in states where there was no parity 
condition connected to the receipt of the cash (ie. states designated by the programme as 
low priority) leaves the point estimates essentially the same (Panel C). Finally, allowing 
for the possibility of confounding trends, by including state-specific time trends, reduces 
the magnitude of the estimates although the general pattern of results remains unchanged 
(Panel D).  
 
 
VI. Heterogeneity in Impacts 
We first examine how the effect of the JSY is distributed along several standard dimensions 
of socioeconomic status, namely maternal education and household wealth. These can be 
considered demand-side factors that may modify the effect of the JSY on health care 
seeking behaviour. We then study whether there is a dose-response relationship. By 
exploiting the fact that the JSY substantially varies the amount of cash paid to women in 
                                                     
26 These findings hold if we interact time with categories of JSY coverage (result not shown).  
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different places, we are able to learn more about a fundamental policy parameter. The 
amount of cash paid to women is more generous in rural areas than urban areas within high 
focus states, and in high focus states than low focus states. We therefore conduct two 
subgroup analyses along these lines.  
 
Table 6 presents the JSY treatment effects across various subsamples with public facility 
births as the dependent variable. The first two columns show that the effect of the JSY on 
utilisation is greater amongst women with no education than women with some education 
(p value of the difference is <0.001). The next two columns compare the treatment effect 
between the two wealth groups, with point estimates showing a similar pattern to the 
education results. Poorer women are more likely to give birth in a public health facility in 
response to the JSY than richer women (p value of the difference is <0.001). The results in 
the remaining four columns show that the effect of the JSY was larger in places where the 
amount of cash offered to women was greater. The response to the JSY was greater in rural 
areas than urban areas (p value of the difference is 0.058) and greater in low focus than 
high focus states (p value of the difference is <0.001). When considered relative to the 
baseline mean, the differences between the subgroups are clearly large.  
 
 
VII. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined the association between one of the world’s largest demand-
side financial incentive programmes and health-related outcomes in India. Consistent with 
much of the literature outside of India, we find that the financial incentives in the JSY are 
associated with an increase in the use of formal health services, particularly at lower levels 
of the public health system. The increase in use of formal maternal health care due to the 
programme was modest. Our findings on neonatal mortality show no strong evidence of an 
effect, although confidence intervals are not sufficiently tight to reject modest effects of 
the JSY on mortality.  
 
A persuasive explanation for the mortality finding is that the JSY incentivised women 
predominantly to health facilities whose purpose was not to manage life-threatening 
complications. However good the quality of care in health institutions below the district 
hospital, it may remain inadequate to save the lives of women and their baby, particularly 
when obstetric emergencies require intensive rather than obstetric care (Costello et al., 
2006). Having a fully functional referral system is thus critical for the success of any 
intervention which seeks to increase uptake of institutional delivery care (Campbell and 
Graham, 2006). Existing evidence suggests that the quality of maternity services and the 
referral system in the public sector remains poor in India (Chaturvedi et al., 2014; Hulton 
et al., 2007; Nagpal et al., 2015; Stanton et al., 2014). 
 
We have argued that high powered incentives have the potential to influence a broad range 
of behaviours, intended or otherwise. Any evaluation of financial incentives should go 
beyond the narrow objectives of the programme to examine potential unintended 
consequences. Our pregnancy results are striking because they suggest a pathway through 
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which the programme’s own objective of reducing maternal and neonatal mortality may be 
undermined. It also serves to demonstrate the importance of anticipating such risks in the 
programme design and, in turn, ensuring appropriate measures are put into practice.  
 
A further point of discussion relates to the generalisability of our findings to an expanded 
JSY programme, say five years down the line. It is certainly possible that the effect of the 
programme has increased as it has matured. Women will only be incentivised by the 
programme if they know about the benefits but it takes time for such information to spread 
in the population. Alternatively, the effects in this paper may be larger than those observed 
when the JSY finally reaches all districts in India. Early implementation of the JSY was 
understandably prioritised in districts that contain poorer populations and evidence on 
impact heterogeneity suggests that these districts were the ones where the greatest benefits 
from the programme could be realised. Thus, extending our estimates of effect to the period 
since 2008 may not provide a good approximation to the true impact of the programme.  
 
The collective evidence in this paper, on both intended and unintended effects, points 
towards the need for policymakers to be cautious in the use of financial incentives. For 
example, even though it is self-evident that the supply-side must be in place if demand-side 
financial incentives are to work, there is a proliferation of schemes in countries where the 
quality and even availability of care are vastly inadequate. Future research on this topic 
should broaden its scope to address questions around their long-term effects, and the 
potential harms they may cause (Lagarde et al., 2007).  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
2001/02-2004/05  
(before JSY) 
2005/06-2007/08 
(during JSY) 
Panel A. Study outcomes 
Neonatal mortality (per 1,000 live births) 33.0 26.6 
One-day mortality (per 1,000 live births) 16.1 13.0 
Health worker in attendance at delivery (%) 46.0 49.1 
Delivery in a health facility (%) 38.7 43.7 
Public health provider (%) 20.0 25.5 
Private health provider (%) 18.7 18.2 
Caesarean section (%) 7.3 8.1 
Assisted delivery (%) 2.6 1.8 
At least three antenatal care visits (%) 43.6 46.9 
Breastfeeding within one hour of birth (%) 31.1 39.9 
Pregnant in a given year (%) - 7.7 
   
Panel B. Individual covariates 
Urban (%)  26.1 18.3 
Hindu (%) 76.3 76.0 
Scheduled caste (%) 18.4 19.0 
Scheduled tribe (%) 16.7 17.6 
Other backward caste / tribe (%) 40.0 40.6 
Maternal age (years) 24.6 25.0 
Number of live births 2.64 2.54 
Woman’s education (grades completed) 4.36 4.47 
Husband’s education (grades completed) 6.66 6.62 
Household wealth asset (score) -0.018 -0.053 
Notes: Summary statistics are based on data from the DLHS-2 and DLHS-3, including observations over the 
period 2001/02 – 2007/08. The unit of observation is a woman’s most recent delivery, except in the case of 
neonatal mortality (live birth) and pregnant this year (woman-year). Assisted delivery includes the use of 
forceps or a ventouse. The household asset wealth score is generated by applying principal component analysis 
to a set of household asset ownership variables. 
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Table 2. JSY Coverage 
 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
Districts with 
JSY coverage 0-10% 279 163 98 
JSY coverage 10-25% 151 137 144 
JSY coverage 25-50% 123 164 162 
JSY coverage >50% 34 123 183 
Total sample 587 587 587 
Notes: Based on data from the DLHS-3.  
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Table 3. Association of JSY with Use of Maternal Health Care Services 
Dependent variable: 
Health worker in 
attendance at delivery 
Delivery in a 
health facility 
Delivery in public 
health facility 
Delivery by type of public health facility 
At least three 
ANC visits Hospital 
Community 
health centre 
Primary health 
centre 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A. Baseline model 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.0053 -0.0061 -0.00072 0.00081 0.0010 0.0023 0.00071 
 (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0053) 
JSY coverage 25-50% 0.0017 0.0072 0.019*** 0.0033 0.0092*** 0.011*** 0.0052 
 (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0047) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0061) 
JSY coverage >50% 0.056*** 0.075*** 0.11*** 0.028*** 0.040*** 0.051*** 0.010 
 (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0086) (0.0061) (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0075) 
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.0021 -0.0033 -0.0015 -0.00011 0.0016 0.0018 0.00099 
 (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0048) 
JSY coverage 25-50% 0.0028 0.0075 0.013** 0.00017 0.010*** 0.0078*** 0.0035 
 (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0044) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0057) 
JSY coverage >50% 0.063*** 0.082*** 0.10*** 0.027*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.010 
 (0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0057) (0.0046) (0.0037) (0.0073) 
Mean of dep. variable at baseline 0.46 0.39 0.20 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.45 
Number of observations 342,875 342,875 342,875 342,875 342,875 342,875 340,323 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in 
parentheses. Health worker is in attendance if the birth is in a health facility or at home with a doctor, nurse, midwife, or lady health volunteer. Baseline model includes fixed effects for district and 
year of birth. Model with district and individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and wealth 
asset score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, 
number of live births, a multiple birth and survey round. The unit of observation is a delivery (most recent only). Deviations in sample size are due to missing data. 
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Table 4. Association of JSY with Neonatal Mortality 
Dependent variable: 
Neonatal mortality 
Disaggregated measures of mortality 
1 day mortality Death between 2 and 28 days Death between 8 and 28 days 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Baseline model 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.00078 -0.0013 0.00051 0.00026 
 (0.0012) (0.00085) (0.00085) (0.00049) 
JSY coverage 25-50% -0.00030 -0.00048 0.00018 0.000067 
 (0.0013) (0.00093) (0.00092) (0.00051) 
JSY coverage >50% -0.0031* -0.0020* -0.0011 -0.00057 
 (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.00065) 
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.00043 -0.0012 0.00075 0.00036 
 (0.0012) (0.00086) (0.00084) (0.00049) 
JSY coverage 25-50% 0.00026 -0.00051 0.00077 0.00030 
 (0.0012) (0.00095) (0.00089) (0.00053) 
JSY coverage >50% -0.0027 -0.0022* -0.00053 -0.00029 
 (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.00066) 
Mean of dep. variable at baseline 0.031 0.015 0.016 0.0060 
Number of observations 429,443 429,443 429,443 429,443 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported 
in parentheses. Baseline model includes fixed effects for district and year of birth. Model with district and individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of 
the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and wealth asset score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth 
asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, number of live births, a multiple birth and survey round. The unit of observation is a live birth (based on 
the birth history of a woman). 
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Table 5. Association of JSY with Unintended Outcomes 
Dependent variable 
Place of delivery 
Pregnant 
(2004 – 2008) 
Breastfeeding 
Private health  
facility 
Public health  
facility 
Within 1 hour Within 24 hours 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Baseline model 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.0053 -0.00072 0.00058  0.016** 0.015*  
 (0.0041) (0.0049) (0.0011)  (0.0071) (0.0082)  
JSY coverage 25-50% -0.012*** 0.019*** 0.0011  0.026*** 0.025*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0012)  (0.0085) (0.0096)  
JSY coverage >50% -0.034*** 0.11*** 0.0070*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0086) (0.0019)  (0.011) (0.013)  
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.0018 -0.0015 0.0016 0.017** 0.015*  
 (0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0010) (0.0072) (0.0081)  
JSY coverage 25-50% -0.0053 0.013** 0.0026** 0.026*** 0.023**  
 (0.0040) (0.0055) (0.0012) (0.0087) (0.0097)  
JSY coverage >50% -0.022*** 0.10*** 0.0094*** 0.073*** 0.069*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0084) (0.0020) (0.012) (0.014)  
Mean of dep. variable at baseline 0.19 0.20 0.086 0.32 0.54 
Number of observations 342,875 342,875 2,528,498 336,252 336,252  
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3, except column (3) which uses pregnancy data from women in the DLHS-3 only. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% 
level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Standard deviation of the dependent variable mean is in square brackets. Column (3) assumes 
that the number of months a woman has been pregnant, if pregnant at the time of interview, is as good as random (constrained to be between three and nine months). Baseline model includes 
fixed effects for district and year of birth. Model with district and individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, 
tribal population share, and wealth asset score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and 
dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, number of live births, a multiple birth, and survey round. The unit of observation is a delivery (most recent only), except in columns (3) 
where it is a woman-year. 
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Table 6. Heterogeneity in the Effect of the JSY on Government Facility Births 
 
Education of mother  Wealth of household  
Residence  
(in high focus states)  
 Focal states 
No 
education 
Some 
education 
 Poorest half Richest half  Urban Rural  High focus Low focus 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Panel A. Baseline model 
JSY coverage 0.22*** 0.18***  0.22*** 0.18***  0.19*** 0.24***  0.22*** 0.0083 
 (0.016) (0.014)  (0.017) (0.015)  (0.027) (0.017)  (0.017) (0.020) 
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls 
JSY coverage 0.22*** 0.18***  0.23*** 0.18***  0.18*** 0.24***  0.23*** -0.012 
 (0.016) (0.014)  (0.016) (0.015)  (0.027) (0.017)   (0.016) (0.021) 
Mean of dep. variable at baseline 0.11 0.28  0.12 0.28  0.28 0.13  0.16 0.28 
Number of observations 161,813 181,062  174,488 168,387  42,155 191,197   233,352 109,523 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported 
in parentheses. Standard deviation of the dependent variable mean is in square brackets. Baseline model includes fixed effects for district and year of birth. Model with district and individual 
controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and wealth asset score as well as individual controls 
for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, number of live births, a 
multiple birth, and survey round. The demographic variable on which the sample is divided is excluded. The unit of observation is a delivery (most recent only). 
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Figure 1. JSY Coverage and Proportion of Women Giving Birth in a Government Facility 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. District Correlates of JSY Coverage 
 Wealth Poverty 
Tribal 
population 
State fixed 
effects 
Government 
facility births 
at baseline 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Average asset wealth score -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.041*** -0.017** -0.018* 
 (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0088) (0.0092) 
Poor share of population  0.13*** 0.12** 0.13** 0.13** 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.055) (0.056) 
Tribal share of population   0.14*** -0.0053 -0.0053 
   (0.030) (0.037) (0.037) 
Government facility share of births     0.0059 
     (0.044) 
State fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,761 1,761 1,761 1,761 1,761 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is JSY coverage. The unit of observation is a district-year over the period 
2005/06 to 2007/08. Government facility share of births is measured at baseline (2004/05). 
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Table A2. JSY as a Binary Treatment 
Dependent variable: 
Delivery in a 
health facility 
Delivery in 
public facility 
Delivery in 
private facility 
ANC three 
visits 
Neonatal 
mortality 
One-day 
mortality 
Pregnant  
(2004-08) 
Breastfeeding 
within 1 hour 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A. Baseline model 
JSY coverage > 10% 0.013** 0.025*** -0.012*** 0.0040 -0.00098 -0.0011 0.0014 0.030*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0052) (0.0011) (0.00079) (0.0010) (0.0074) 
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls 
JSY coverage > 10% 0.013*** 0.019*** -0.0059* 0.0032 -0.00050 -0.0011 0.0025** 0.028*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0035) (0.0048) (0.0011) (0.00080) (0.00099) (0.0074) 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported 
in parentheses. Health worker is in attendance if the birth is in a health facility or at home with a doctor, nurse, midwife, or lady health volunteer. Baseline model includes fixed effects for 
district and year of birth. Model with district and individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population 
share, and wealth asset score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of 
urban dwelling, religion, number of live births, a multiple birth and survey round. The unit of observation is a delivery (most recent only). Deviations in sample size are due to missing data. 
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Table A3. JSY as a Continuous Treatment 
Dependent variable: 
Delivery in a 
health facility 
Delivery in 
public facility 
Delivery in 
private facility 
ANC three 
visits 
Neonatal 
mortality 
One-day 
mortality 
Pregnant  
(2004-08) 
Breastfeeding 
within 1 hour 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A. Baseline model 
JSY coverage  0.15*** 0.20*** -0.059*** 0.020* -0.0035 -0.0022 0.013*** 0.12*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.0072) (0.012) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.016) 
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls 
JSY coverage 0.16*** 0.20*** -0.041*** 0.023** -0.0033 -0.0026 0.017*** 0.12*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.0067) (0.012) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.061) (0.017)  
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported 
in parentheses. Health worker is in attendance if the birth is in a health facility or at home with a doctor, nurse, midwife, or lady health volunteer. Baseline model includes fixed effects for 
district and year of birth. Model with district and individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population 
share, and wealth asset score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of 
urban dwelling, religion, number of live births, a multiple birth and survey round. The unit of observation is a delivery (most recent only). Deviations in sample size are due to missing data. 
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Table A4. Association of JSY with Medical Procedures at Childbirth 
Dependent variable: Caesarean section Assisted delivery 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A. Baseline model 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.0038 0.0012  
 (0.0026) (0.0020)  
JSY coverage 25-50% -0.0032 0.0019  
 (0.0028) (0.0022)  
JSY coverage >50% -0.013*** 0.0076*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0027)  
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.0021 0.0014 
 (0.0024) (0.0020) 
JSY coverage 25-50% 0.00081 0.0016 
 (0.0027) (0.0023) 
JSY coverage >50% -0.0054* 0.0066** 
 (0.0031) (0.0028) 
Mean of dependent variable at baseline 0.075 0.024 
Number of observations 342,853 342,853 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% 
level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Standard 
deviation of the dependent variable mean is in square brackets. Assisted delivery involves the use of forceps or a 
ventouse. Baseline model includes fixed effects for district and year of birth. Model with district and individual 
controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, 
tribal population share, and wealth asset score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s 
education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of urban 
dwelling, religion, number of live births, a multiple birth, and survey round. 
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Table A5. Differences in Pre-Trends 
 
Delivery in a 
facility 
Delivery in 
public facility 
Neonatal  
mortality 
One-day  
mortality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Baseline model 
Time 0.011*** 0.0042* -0.0046*** -0.0027*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.00060) (0.00039) 
Time x JSY coverage -0.011* 0.0057 0.00027 0.0013 
 (0.0064) (0.0058) (0.0017) (0.0010) 
Panel B. Baseline model with district and individual controls 
Time -0.00019 -0.0086 0.0045*** 0.0014 
 (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0017) (0.0012) 
Time x JSY coverage -0.00071 0.0090 0.0020 0.0020* 
 (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0017) (0.0011) 
Mean of dependent variable 0.39 0.20 0.033 0.016 
Number of observations 168,887 168,887 226,567 226,567 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3 but are for the period before the start of the JSY only. *** 
denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Baseline model includes time (birth year since start of data 
period), an interaction between time and coverage of the JSY, and fixed effects for district. Model with district and 
individual controls includes interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the poverty 
line, tribal population share, and wealth asset score as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s 
education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset score, recall period, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, 
religion, number of live births, a multiple birth, and survey round. 
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Table A6. Correlation between JSY Coverage and Demographics 
 JSY coverage JSY coverage 
Delivery in a 
health facility 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Urban -0.00050 -0.00067 0.049*** 
 (0.00097) (0.00090) -0.0052 
Hindu -0.00069 -0.00047 0.030*** 
 (0.00091) (0.00085) -0.005 
Scheduled caste  -0.00025 0.000036 0.026*** 
 (0.0010) (0.00098) -0.0049 
Scheduled tribe  0.00054 0.00034 -0.049*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) -0.0073 
“Other backward” ethnicity 0.00028 0.00045 0.0034 
 (0.00082) (0.00076) -0.0045 
Woman’s education (grades completed) -0.00016* -0.00014 0.0040*** 
 (0.000093) (0.000086) -0.00043 
Husband’s education (grades completed) 0.000028 0.000077 0.0018*** 
 (0.000084) (0.000079) -0.00032 
Two live births 0.0030*** 0.0014* -0.048*** 
 (0.00089) (0.00082) -0.0036 
Three live births 0.0033*** 0.0025** -0.068*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) -0.0046 
Four live births 0.0011 0.00080 -0.091*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) -0.0052 
Five or more live births 0.00063 0.0014 -0.100*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) -0.0061 
Mother’s age at childbirth (years) -0.000094 -0.00011 0.00018 
 (0.000085) (0.000079) -0.00032 
Wealth asset score 0.00026 0.0000095 -0.0027** 
 (0.00022) (0.00020) -0.0012 
Multiple birth 0.0027 0.0024 0.069*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0026) -0.011 
District controls No Yes Yes 
F (14, 586) 2.01 1.18 57.72 
p-value 0.015 0.290 <0.001 
Number of observations 173,988 173,988 173,988 
Number of districts 587 587 587 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% 
level. Standard errors, corrected for clustering at the district level, are reported in parentheses. Regressions 
includes fixed effects for district and year of birth, as well as the variables reported. Regression in column (2) 
and (3) further include interactions between year of birth and district share of the population below the 
poverty line, tribal population share, and mean wealth asset score.  
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Table A7. Further Robustness Checks 
 
Delivery in 
public facility 
Delivery in 
private facility 
One-day 
mortality 
Pregnant 
(2004-08) 
Breastfeeding 
within 1 hour 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Three-year long differences (2001, 2004, 2007) 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.0014 0.0028 -0.0020 n/a 0.0057 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.0024)  (0.019) 
JSY coverage 25-50% 0.026** 0.00085 0.00082 n/a 0.0061 
 (0.012) (0.0100) (0.0025)  (0.019) 
JSY coverage >50% 0.17*** -0.024** -0.0014 n/a 0.091*** 
 (0.014) (0.0096) (0.0025)  (0.019) 
Panel B. Exclude high mortality districts 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.00071 -0.0032 -0.00084 0.0018* 0.020*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0042) (0.00081) (0.0011) (0.0075) 
JSY coverage 25-50% 0.015** -0.0059 -0.000059 0.0027** 0.026*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0042) (0.00091) (0.0013) (0.0090) 
JSY coverage >50% 0.10*** -0.023*** -0.0018 0.0097*** 0.071*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0047) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.012) 
Panel C. Exclude low priority states 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.0016 -0.00027 -0.00060 0.00091 0.026*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0046) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0098) 
JSY coverage 25-50% 0.017** -0.0039 -0.00060 0.0016 0.046*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0048) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.012) 
JSY coverage >50% 0.11*** -0.021*** -0.0028** 0.0090*** 0.089*** 
 (0.010) (0.0056) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.015) 
Panel D. State-specific time trends 
JSY coverage 10-25% -0.0096** -0.0016 -0.0011 0.0029*** 0.013** 
 (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.00088) (0.0010) (0.0056) 
JSY coverage 25-50% -0.010** -0.0017 -0.0011 0.0040*** 0.011 
 (0.0049) (0.0037) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0065) 
JSY coverage >50% 0.033*** -0.010** -0.0023* 0.0052** 0.016 
 (0.0078) (0.0044) (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.010) 
Notes: Data are from the DLHS-2 and the DLHS-3. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. 
All estimates are from a model that includes fixed effects for district and year of birth, interactions between year 
of birth and district share of the population below the poverty line, tribal population share, and wealth asset score 
as well as individual controls for mother’s education, husband’s education, mother’s age at birth, wealth asset 
score, recall period, and dummies for categories of urban dwelling, religion, number of live births, a multiple 
birth, and survey round. 
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Online Appendix (Not for Publication) 
 
A. Comparison to Lim et al (2010) 
Lim et al (2010) present estimates of the effect of the JSY using the same survey data we use but 
different empirical methods. They produce estimates based on three alternative methods of 
analysis: exact matching, with versus without, and a difference-in-difference analysis. The first two 
methods are based on individual level data while the latter uses data aggregated at the district level.  
We compare results to examine whether there are differences. While such a comparison cannot in 
itself explain why there are differences, our critical review of the methods used by Lim et al (2010) 
in Section II.C suggests that there are some important sources of potential bias in their estimates of 
effect.  
 
A comparison of the effect estimates between the two studies is complicated by the fact that 
treatment is defined differently. Lim et al (2010) define treatment as whether the woman reports 
receiving the JSY cash. In their difference-in-difference analysis, treatment is defined analogously 
as the district fraction of births receiving the JSY cash. By contrast, we define treatment as the 
district fraction of births in a public health facility in which the woman receives the JSY cash, and 
then generate categories of JSY coverage for the empirical analysis.   
 
To make a comparison between the two studies more meaningful we report estimates in which our 
treatment variable, JSY coverage, enters the regression as a continuous variable. These are the same 
estimates as those reported in Table A3 of the Appendix. While this goes some way to improving 
comparability, differences in the definition of treatment between the two studies remain and this 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the findings. 
 
Table 1. Comparison with Lim et al (2010) 
 Lim et al (2010) 
 Powell-Jackson 
et al (2015) 
 Exact matching 
With versus 
without 
Diff-in-diff 
 
Diff-in-diff 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
ANC 3 visits or more (%) 10.7 11.1 10.9  2.3 
 (9.1 to 12.3) (10.1 to 12.1) (4.6 to 17.2)  (0.05 to 4.6) 
Facility birth (%) 43.5 43.9 49.2  16.0 
 (42.5 to 44.6) (43.3 to 44.6) (43.2 to 55.1)  (13.6 to 19.0) 
Neonatal deaths (per 1,000) -2.3 -2.4 -6.2  -3.3 
 (-3.7 to -0.9) (-4.1 to -0.7) (-20.4 to 8.1)  (-8.3 to 1.6) 
Notes: Confidence intervals are reported in parentheses. The treatment effects are in percentage points (ANC 3+, facility 
births) or deaths per 1,000 (neonatal mortality).  
 
Our findings are much less encouraging than those of Lim et al (2010) in terms of the effects on 
healthcare utilisation (Table 1). There is roughly a threefold difference between the two studies in 
the effect on facility births and the difference is similar when use of antenatal care is the outcome. 
The estimates of impact on neonatal mortality are of the same order magnitude in the two studies. 
The main difference lies in the fact that the mortality effects in Lim et al (2010) are statistically 
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significant in two of the three identification strategies they use. The confidence interval around our 
negative effect of 3.3 deaths per 1,000 means we are unable to reject a modest effect of the JSY on 
neonatal mortality.  
 
B. Pre-trends 
Figure 1 to Figure 4 use data prior to the official start of the JSY to show trends for districts 
categorised according to different levels of JSY coverage as measured in 2007/08. Pre-trends are 
shown for the proportion of women giving birth in a facility, the proportion of women giving birth 
in government facility, neonatal mortality per 1,000 live births and one-day mortality per 1,000 live 
births. For each outcome, we can see that the trends are similar between different groups of JSY 
coverage.  
  
Figure 1. Pre-trends for Facility Births 
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Figure 2. Pre-trends for Government Facility Births 
 
 
Figure 3. Pre-trends for Neonatal Mortality 
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Figure 4. Pre-trends for One-Day Mortality 
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